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Abstract  
The conclusion of a new overarching Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between 15 Asia-Pacific countries has been celebrated across the 
globe. Its signatories are the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
countries and Japan, Korea, China, Australia and New Zealand; India withdrew from the 
agreement at the last moment.  
The signing of the RCEP is certainly good news for world trade and investment. It brings 
together a group of countries representing 30% of the global population and generating 29% 
of its GDP. It aims to facilitate and solidify global value chains; accept opening-up in terms of 
tariffs (while aiming to discipline non-tariff barriers); build a legal framework for services, trade, 
and investment; and address e-commerce issues such as the commitment not to impose data 
localisation. Much like the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (an FTA 
between 11 APEC countries, without the US), and the EU/Japan Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA), the RCEP demonstrates once again that the US under the Trump 
administration was effectively alone in its attempts to disrupt further globalisation. 
Nevertheless, the RCEP is not a deep FTA and stipulates slow liberalisation over long periods of 
time, among its other peculiarities. It may also impact East Asian regionalism in the long term. 
This paper explains the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led origin of the RCEP 
in the context of APEC,1 summarises the substance of the agreement, and gives an inevitably 
crude first estimate of its impact on trade and overall income, as well as its structural 
implications. It concludes with reflections on the possible long-term implications of the RCEP 
for East Asian regionalism, for world trade and investment, and for the European Union.  
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1.  The RCEP as the latest child of APEC 
The RCEP is the second big follow-up to APEC’s original goal to pursue “concerted unilateral 
liberalisation” and “open regionalism” as methods of liberalisation of trade and investment 
without binding treaties.2 While APEC’s stimulus ultimately proved to be short-lived, it did 
successfully remove some of the fears held by its Asian signatories around hard commitments 
in trade and investment, aided by the inauguration of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 
1995, to which China gained membership in 2001. In 1992, ASEAN initiated the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) in a move that proved much less controversial and more beneficial than first 
expected. Emboldened by AFTA’s success, in 2003 it initiated an ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC), with the longer-term option of creating a single market.3 Moreover, despite not having 
a common trade policy (as it is itself an FTA), ASEAN consulted with its ‘dialogue partners’ to 
explore interest in concluding FTAs. What became the ASEAN Plus Six culminated in FTAs 
between the ASEAN-10 and each one of six partners: Japan, Korea, China, India, Australia, and 
New Zealand. Establishing FTAs with the Six was especially significant in terms of tariffs and 
customs facilitation critical to value chains. How important this was for ASEAN might be better 
appreciated if one realises that – even with AFTA – trade and investment for ASEAN countries 
was predominantly with OECD4 markets, and later on with China and India, with intra-ASEAN 
transactions only gradually taking on greater importance.  
At the same time, APEC had weakened to the point of no longer providing a forum for truly 
joint trade liberalisation. North America had its North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and FTAs with APEC members Peru and Chile. The US was however concerned by the rapid rise 
of China, with the Obama administration pursuing more aggressively a ‘pivot to Asia’ In 2012, 
the US joined an initiative of deeper trade liberalisation which, by 2016, developed into the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement between 12 APEC countries, with the deliberate 
exclusion of China. APEC now comprised two trade initiatives, one ASEAN-led with no less than 
six partners, and the emergent, relatively ‘deep’ TPP agreement without China or the ASEAN-
10. The evolving ASEAN Plus Six FTAs were replete with complex rules of origin (ROO) between 
parties.5 Moreover, as ASEAN is not a customs union with a common trade policy, all ASEAN 
countries concluded their own versions of bilateral FTAs with each of the six partners. The result 
was considered so problematic that an APEC business conference in Seoul a decade ago, prior 
to the APEC summit, collectively called for a common East Asian arrangement around rules of 
origin, in order to support value chains.  
Both the RCEP and TPP negotiations (following the involvement of the US) began in earnest in 
2012. The TPP treaty was concluded in 2016 but in 2017 President Trump withdrew the US and 
the 11 remaining countries slightly modified the treaty, renaming it CPTPP. Table 1 lists the 
countries in RCEP and the CPTPP. The RCEP, concluded on 15 November 2020, is the result of 
 
2 For a detailed and careful review, see De Dios (1998). 
3 For an extensive analysis of the AEC, see Pelkmans (2016). 
4 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (33 developed countries) 
5 Between parties and not to ASEAN directly, for which the six FTAs would usually simplify matters. 
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a strong desire to consolidate and simplify the ASEAN Plus Six process, while incorporating a 
number of further additions. One test of the value of the new RCEP is therefore what impact it 
has on reducing the existing complexity of origin rules and the facilitation of value chains.  
2. What is the RCEP?  
RCEP is a massive treaty in the sense that the 15 countries (indeed, even the ASEAN-10, to some 
degree) often have their own liberalisation or market access schedules as well as a host of 
schedules about services and investment. (Remember that ASEAN countries have their own 
trade policies, despite ASEAN’s common strategy vis-à-vis the RCEP partners). The following 
cannot be more than indicative, at best, of the substance of RCEP. 






Australia  Australia  
Brunei Darussalam  (AS) Brunei Darussalam  (AS) 
  Cambodia  (AS) 
Canada    
Chile    
  China  
  Indonesia (AS) 
Japan  Japan  
  Laos   (AS) 
Malaysia  (AS) Malaysia (AS) 
Mexico    
  Myanmar (AS) 
New Zealand  New Zealand  
Peru    
  Philippines  (AS) 
Singapore (AS) Singapore (AS) 
  South Korea  
  Thailand  (AS) 
Vietnam (AS) Vietnam (AS) 
Source: author. 
The RCEP has 20 chapters6 comprising goods, unified rules of origin, customs procedures and 
trade facilitation, SPS and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),7 trade remedies, services (with 3 
sectoral annexes),8 the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) mode-4 services (the 
temporary movement of natural persons, mostly in reference to business representatives but 
 
6 All texts can be downloaded via www.rcepsec.org/legal-text/ and annexes via ZIP files.  
7 The precise heading of this chapter is Standards, Technical regulations and Conformity Assessment Procedures. 
8 On financial services, telecoms services and professionals ones respectively. 
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also spouses with a short stay of a few years), investment, intellectual property, electronic 
commerce, competition,9 small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), Economic and Technical 
Cooperation, government procurement, dispute settlement10 as well as institutional, general 
and final provision chapters.  
The most basic drive behind the RCEP is to adapt and simplify the application of rules of origin. 
This has been achieved, including the right for business originating in the RCEP area to claim 
cumulation of origin (often called diagonal cumulation in the EU). A hypothetical case illustrates 
the point. Suppose an Australian producer of intermediate goods exports these goods to RCEP 
countries X and Y. When in country Y, the final good incorporating the Australian input is 
exported to X, the RCEP tariff preferences will also apply to the Australian input. This may 
appear complex but reflects how regional and global value chains [GVCs] operate. When GVCs 
are the leading business model – as is the case in East Asia – this cumulation matters a lot. In 
addition, cumulation might, in the margin, attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) hoping 
to exploit its benefits.  
At the moment, it is unclear how much RCEP exporters will benefit in the short term given that 
some liberalisation schedules are extremely slow (up to 20 years). There is already considerable 
concern that a number of the parliaments in ASEAN countries and possibly Australia will prove 
unreceptive to trade and investment arguments, because anti-Chinese sentiment or the fear 
of competing with an influx of Chinese goods might prevail.11 The final result of trade 
liberalisation will thus be diverse and country-specific. The Australian government claims that 
no less than 89% of current Australian exports to the region will benefit from immediate duty-
free access. Japan claims that 86% of goods exported to China will see tariffs eliminated (with 
no exact timing indicated, but significantly higher than the current 8%), 81% for exports to 
Korea and 88% to ASEAN. On the face of it, these shares seem high, but a general rule of thumb 
for FTAs is that shares should be above 90% before hitting the sensitive subsectors where the 
true gains in market access come into play. In other words, selective estimates can be (too) 
suggestive or even misleading. In farm products, liberalisation is considerable but it is not 
surprising that Japan has insisted on the exclusion of five products: rice, wheat, dairy, sugar, 
beef, and pork. On non-tariff barriers, only cooperation and transparency is in.  
On services, the RCEP is mainly concerned with the lock-in of existing regulatory provisions in 
RCEP countries. Surprisingly, negative listing has been adopted to this end, a method typically 
 
9 With 4 annexes for countries without much, if any, tradition in this respect: Myanmar, Lao, Brunei and Cambodia. 
The AEC does however comprise a joint cooperative framework for domestic competition policies.  
10 Although dispute settlement is a standard tool in the WTO, and applies to TBT and SPS questions as well, in the 
RCEP, dispute settlement does not apply to these two chapters. This might be due to old sensitivities in ASEAN 
about dispute settlement in its own AFTA. See Pelkmans (2016), pp. 84-5. 
11 An example from the recent past is telling. When the Indonesian-China FTA (under the ASEAN umbrella FTA with 
China) was concluded a decade ago, it generated a groundswell of opposition, especially amongst SMEs in 
Indonesia. The upshot was that the Indonesian Trade Minister at the time, Dr. Mari Pangestu, had to resign (and 
subsequently became Tourism Minister).  
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regarded as pro-liberalisation. The chapter does go further in sectoral issues such as e-
commerce where (sensitive) data localisation obligations are prohibited (except in the case of 
national security, leaving open the question of how China will interpret the rules). 
Commitments on professional services (country by country), education services, healthcare 
services and a series of “other business services” will improve access (with a ratchet effect) and 
new commitments have been undertaken, again by country (e.g. China on transport). While 
investment protection is in the treaty, some RCEP members already have bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) with each other, so the overall picture of progress is disparate. Interestingly, the 
non-inclusion of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) will be reviewed in two years; an 
opportunity for the EU to promote the multilateral court approach it advocates. In financial 
services (with the usual carve-out for financial stability), transparency improvements are non-
trivial. In telecoms the conventional approach (e.g. the WTO telecoms paper of 1998, co-
sponsored by the EU) has been adopted, including “reasonable roaming rates.” On mode-4, the 
temporary movement of business persons, the RCEP comes close to CETA, which is remarkable 
in itself but also in light of the AEC, which has only highly prudent openings via MRAs.12  
As concerns intellectual property, it is held that the RCEP will complement the WTO TRIPs 
Agreement13 e.g. on the basis of due process mechanisms to support the granting of 
geographical indications. But little more. Finally, the chapter on government procurement is 
only about transparency and “cooperation” and does not (at least not yet) move towards the 
regime in the WTO plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). When joining the 
WTO, China signed the Accession Protocol in which it promised to join the GPA. But it never did 
so, despite having submitted seven separate offers, which were judged insufficient by GPA 
partners.14 However, it is the first time that China has signed an FTA with a chapter on public 
purchasing. 
Overall, the RCEP cannot be considered a progressive treaty from an EU point of view. Adopting 
an EU-lens however may not be the most appropriate way to consider the RCEP. A number of 
its signatories have been pulled into a significantly more transparent and open trade and 
investment environment. Moreover, this treaty incorporates expectations of further deepening 
and widening in scope.  
That the RCEP is built on existing FTAs with the ASEAN, but of course also on AFTA and the AEC, 
must be kept in mind. Even though technically the RCEP comprises welcome administrative and 
customs improvements as well as considerable trade facilitation for GVCs, concurrent policy in 
terms of additional market access remains limited for ASEAN (as the hub) and via the ‘spokes’ 
with ASEAN-partners. It is still worthwhile, however, as ASEAN is keen to attract and maintain 
FDI as part of value chains and the facilitation of trade via the spokes is precisely one of its 
 
12 See Pelkmans (2016), pp. 136-7. MRA = mutual recognition agreement, referring to negotiated recognition 
under certain conditions limited to specific professions here. 
13 TRIPs stands for Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
14 For an extensive analysis, including the first six offers, see chapter 12, Pelkmans, Hu, Francois et al., (2018). 
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objectives. However, larger trade and economic effects should be expected between the 
spokes, that is, trade and FDI directly between the partners of the ASEAN.  
3. Trade and economic impact of RCEP, a first estimate 
There have been several attempts to estimate the trade and economic effects of RCEP.15 A 
recent attempt by two seasoned empirical trade economists, Petri & Plummer (2020) familiar 
with Asia-Pacific and ASEAN trade initiatives, work with a sophisticated CGE model.16 Due to 
the simultaneity of the China/US trade war and the conclusion of the RCEP (in 2020) and of 
CPTPP (in 2018), so important for trans-Pacific trade, the authors simulate income and trade 
effects of the trade war and compare them with the simulated effects of the two trade 
initiatives. The income effects of both are juxtaposed in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Global income effects of Asia-Pacific trade policies in 2030 (income gains/losses in 
billions of US dollars) 
 
Source: Petri & Plummer (2020), p. 4. 
 
15 See for example Itakura & Lee (2019) and Mahadevan & Nugroho (2019). 
16 For a basic overview, see Appendix A of Petri & Plummer (2020). Technical details are found in 
www.asiapacifictrade.org and in Petri, Plummer & Zhai (2012). For trade economists, the authors work with 
heterogeneous firms (a la Melitz) and a nested production process in the model which – importantly – allows for 
intermediate inputs, reflecting the GVCs. Note that, at the time of their writing, the literal text of RCEP was not 
available but all the basics from the core chapters had been leaked or provided in press releases. The stylised trade 
liberalisation changes in RCEP are specified in their Table 2. These changes are rather basic and employ general 
averages, implying that the estimates are therefore rather crude.  
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Normally, such estimates would amount to what is shown in the left panel of Figure 1. RCEP-15 
would generate some $186bn in additional income. In the right-hand panel (under sustained 
trade war), the starting point is a loss of $301bn but the two trade initiatives compensate with 
their benefits: CPTPP makes $121bn and RCEP-15 considerably more at $209bn. The 
incremental value of the CPTPP is $26bn less under the trade war as compared to the 
incremental value of the RCEP-15 with an increase of $23bn, because China benefits from trade 
switching.17 Nevertheless, in a business-before-Trump (‘as usual’) scenario, the overall income 
gains of RCEP-15 amounting to $186bn is not high given the enormous relative size of the group 
in terms of GDP and of population. The three reasons for these limited simulated gains are that 
i) ASEAN intra trade is barely affected, ii) trade over the ASEAN-partner spokes is facilitated and 
stimulated via cumulation, but tariff concessions are few (mostly already made before in 
FTAs),and iii) NTBs have not been addressed in earnest (Petri & Plummer assume a stylised 10% 
lower trading costs).  
Turning to trade flows, world trade due to RCEP18 would augment by $504bn. The large bulk of 
this increase is enjoyed by China ($236bn) and Japan & Korea (together $193bn), leaving only 
$56bn for the other 12 RCEP countries and a relatively pitiful $4bn for the US and a meagre 
$14bn for the rest of the world. However, those 14bn are generated largely by interaction by 
outsiders with RCEP countries – when focusing only on trade between non-RCEP countries, 
there is a fall of some $39 bn-$48bn. This is likely to reflect trade diversion. The biggest winner 
in this simulation is China. Given that China has better market access to the four non-ASEAN 
countries of RCEP, this is hardly surprising. That is also why China was in favour of the RCEP 
from the outset. The positive income effect of RCEP for China is $100bn and the sectoral export 
effects are all positive for five categories,19 ranging between 4.4%-8.8%. For Europe, a very 
small benefit for the CPTPP ($8bn) compares with an even smaller but negative impact of RCEP 
on EU exports of $4bn. The EU should therefore consider whether the sole focus on separate 
FTAs with countries in the region would suffice. Some form of linkage with both initiatives 
makes both trade and economic sense.  
Finally, it ought to be mentioned that FDI effects are hard to model and even harder to include 
in these types of models. The positive expectations about FDI induced by the RCEP are 
therefore based on typical business reasoning.  
 
17 India seems to shoot itself in the foot. It forgoes some $53 bn income increase, but will lose $6 bn by staying 
out of RCEP, a difference of $60 bn. On the other hand, going by the stylised differences used in the model (in 
their Table 2), with India in, overall tariff liberalisation in RCEP as well as agricultural liberalisation in particular 
would have been lower. This is exactly why India slowed down the negotiations for years, and still exited. Although 
the overall effects of RCEP on Europe are tiny, Europe might expect a net income benefit of $13 bn due to RCEP15, 
but a loss of $1 bn under RCEP16! 
18 Under ‘business before Trump scenario’, and with CPTPP also being implemented (as is indeed happening). 
19 They are: raw materials, light manufactures, advanced manufactures, domestic services and traded services.  
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4. What does the RCEP imply for global and EU trade strategies?  
It is too early for a full assessment of this question, but it is possible to highlight some features 
and offer broad policy recommendations.  
First, the US and various European news media have announced the RCEP as comprising a 
grouping of China and 14 other countries, with suggestions or assertions that China has led this 
process. This interpretation is mistaken, based perhaps on a foreign policy perspective 
common, in particular in the US concerning China’s more dominant role. The process leading 
to the RCEP was ASEAN-led from the beginning and these countries were heavily involved in 
ensuring positive momentum. It is not at all clear what would have resulted if the process had 
been fundamentally China-led over the more than eight years involved, although China did 
provide strong initial support, if only because of expected benefits. It is also likely that the 
upshot of India not joining the RCEP and the US being absent in both FTAs has effectively led to 
a clearer East Asian economic regionalism (if one considers Australasia as part of East Asia, 
which is the preferred perception among the countries involved). Since China now has market 
access to 14 other countries in the region – with the greatest access gains in 4 non-ASEAN 
developed countries, one can expect a boost to regional value chains and, with it, a more 
prominent trade and investment role for China.   
Second, RCEP sends a strong signal that East Asia does not seek more trade protection, let alone 
intend to threaten trade wars, but aims for steady progress and greater openness for trade and 
investment in the region. Ministerial statements published on November 15th proudly 
announce the liberalisation accomplishment and underline the commitment to responsible 
globalisation by the participating countries – this message has now become more credible for 
Europe and will hopefully be heard in the US. However, India’s withdrawal has been widely 
interpreted as a sign of weakness (yet again) when it comes to more trade liberalisation. It is 
true that the RCEP negotiations were considerably lengthened in an attempt to accommodate 
India’s concerns, not least over Chinese competition negatively affecting its industry, and 
India's insistence on continued protection of its poorly developed agricultural sector. It is 
debatable whether with a more modest treaty, including long periods of tariff liberalisation and 
targeted exceptions, India might still have joined but, by not joining, it appears to have also 
foregone significant opportunities, as discussed.  
Third, the legacy of APEC is now fragmented in complex ways, with the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for TPP involving 11 countries, but without the US or China and only 4 
ASEAN countries, and the RCEP involving 15 countries, also without the US, but with a 
considerable (and uneven) overlap with the CPTPP (with China included in the RCEP as well as 
South Korea, which is not in CPTPP).20  
 
20 The principal reason for not joining CPTPP by South Korea at the time was that it already had agreed FTAs with 
the US and the EU.  
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The obvious query is whether the two FTAs can be brought together, in particular because the 
absence of China from the CPTPP weakens the credibility of that treaty. Informal talks on China 
joining the CPTPP have not yielded positive results. The CPTPP is noteworthy for its ambitious 
chapter concerning the role of State-Owned Enterprises and its more extensive commitments 
in some other respects. On the whole, it is regarded as a ‘deeper’ FTA. Since seven countries 
are a member of both FTAs, of which one is Vietnam (with an SOE issue too), there does not 
appear to be any serious obstacle to China also joining the CPTTP. It is worth noting that Japan, 
China and South Korea have been negotiating over 16 rounds and for more than six years to 
form a three-way FTA without success. Via the RCEP, their aims now appear to have been 
achieved to a considerable extent.  
The EU could reach out to East Asia via the RCEP and explore how coalition possibilities to 
promote responsible globalisation could be forged, in informal or even formal ways. The RCEP 
might also help to reinvigorate the EU FTA talks with several ASEAN countries, which are 
presently deadlocked. More generally, however, it is striking that debates about the two FTAs 
in the region and their connection with the US/China trade war are conducted without any 
reference to the EU. One wonders whether this has been realised in the EU. It would serve the 
interests of the EU to retain, if not deepen and widen, its FTA-based approach with a series of 
East Asian countries, while working with China on trade and investment still more 
determinedly, given the possible longer-run implications of the RCEP in terms of East Asian 
economic regionalism.  
While the EU has misgivings concerning China, that is equally the case for most East Asian 
countries, yet these countries have managed to establish and maintain a balanced and 
rewarding trade relationship through FTAs. Furthermore, ASEAN is steadily deepening its AEC, 
with a similar economic objective; namely to make ASEAN attractive for GVCs, preferably in the 
higher value-added sectors. Therefore, even if there are varying European views on the 
extensiveness or otherwise of the RCEP, that treaty clearly has implications worth considering.  
The economic gains are likely to be genuine, though not huge, and its long-term effects in East 
Asia may lead to particular developments in the structure of trade and FDI (and hence GVCs), 
with more leadership for China. For the EU, these scenarios underscore once more the 
importance of successfully concluding the CAI (Comprehensive Agreement on Investment), to 
facilitate engagement with East Asian production networks.  
Finally, the EU should consider establishing more direct links with both the CPTPP and the RCEP, 
despite the EU not being an APEC member. While the EU is a member of ASEM, ASEM has 
refrained from holding meetings of trade ministers since 2005. Perhaps the ministerial 
consultations that ASEAN regularly organises with its partners, including the EU, might provide 
an informal but practical means to explore such links, especially with ASEAN likely to be more 
open to discussion, given its achievement in developing the RCEP.  
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